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Article
Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the
Dynamics of Interpretation
Daniel A. Farbert
Everyone knows that the law changes and that Supreme
Court opinions are an important mechanism of change. (This
may be one of the few propositions so obvious that even law re-
view editors are willing to accept without extensive footnoting.)
But we know very little about how the law changes. Looking
only at Supreme Court opinions, we might wonder whether the
impact of opinions covers a spectrum or whether opinions fall
into two distinct categories of significant but incremental
changes on the one hand, and major breakthrough opinions on
the other hand. Is there a "typical" Supreme Court opinion, in
terms of impact-and if so, what kind of case is typical and how
big is its impact? Surprisingly, little effort has been made to
provide any systematic evidence about these questions.
How judicial opinions change the law and whether they
should do so have received particular attention in the field of
statutory interpretation. William Eskridge's path-breaking ar-
ticle, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, is best known for its
normative claim that statutory interpretation should dynami-
cally adapt to current social values.1 Eskridge pointed to the
sources of stress between existing rules and changing condi-
t Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I
would like to thank Jim Chen for helpful comments on an earlier draft; Paul
Edelman and Mike Farber for assistance with the statistical analysis; and
Brett McDonnell for his insights into connections between law and complexity
theory. An earlier version of this paper was posted as part of an online sympo-
sium on dynamic statutory interpretation and is available at http://www.
bepress.com/ils/iss3/art11. Copyright © 2002, 2005 by Daniel A. Farber.
1. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (arguing for a cautious model of dynamic
statutory interpretation).
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tions. "As society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates
new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute,"
he observed, "the unanticipated gaps and ambiguities prolifer-
ate."2 Moreover, he added, "the legal and constitutional context
of the statute may change."3 Eskridge argued that his model
"depicts what the Supreme Court typically does when it inter-
prets statutes."4 Although his primary focus has remained
normative, Eskridge fleshed out his descriptive claim in his
later work. He argues that the "dynamism introduced by the
interpreter's perspective tends to be more pronounced over
time, as her cultural and political framework diverges from
that of the original drafters."5 But "if that framework becomes
irreconcilable with that of the drafters, statutory interpretation
becomes a discontinuous process of rupture and dramatic po-
litical shifts."6
Eskridge's observations raise a host of issues about how
statutory interpretation actually operates-issues relating to
judicial methodology, cultural and political influences, and the
pace of legal change. Eskridge's primary focus was on methods
of statutory interpretation (originalist versus "dynamic"), but
his work also raises intriguing issues about the dynamics of le-
gal innovation in statutory cases.
Rather than focus on judges' interpretive techniques, this
Article investigates the issues raised by Eskridge's contrasting
use of the terms "typical" (to describe the Court's general meth-
odology) and "rupture" (referring to the occasional paradigm
shift). Some immediate questions come to mind: Is there such a
thing as a "typical" interpretation case? How do the typical
cases (however they are defined) relate to the extraordinary
ones? Is there a continuum? Or is there a dichotomy, with two
distinct classes of routine cases and blockbusters? More fun-
damentally, what kind of dynamic process is at work in statu-
tory interpretation cases?
We all know that, as in the children's game, sometimes the
Court takes "baby steps" and sometimes it takes "giant steps."
But how often does it take each kind of step, and what dynamic
2. Id. at 1480.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1482. As discussed later, the notion of "typicality" is problematic
in this context. See infra Part III.B.
5. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58
(1994).
6. Id. For a case study of this interpretative "rupture," see id. at 66.
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drives the length of the steps? One way to get a handle on these
questions is to examine citation frequencies. An opinion that
takes a "baby step" will likely receive much less attention than
one that takes a "giant step." It will be decisive in fewer future
cases and will have to share the stage with other incremental
rulings about the same issue, thereby diluting its influence. Be-
cause it involves routine application of what Thomas Kuhn
called "normal science," 7 an opinion that takes a baby step will
also receive less attention from commentators. In contrast, an
opinion that takes a "giant step" will set the analytic agenda for
many later decisions. As a dramatic, paradigm-shifting legal
innovation, the opinion will also be more likely to command the
attention of commentators. Thus, the distribution of citation
frequencies, while admittedly an imperfect indicator, should il-
luminate the dynamics of interpretation.
This Article uses citation data for the Supreme Court's
1984 and 1990 Terms to examine three models of the dynamics
of interpretation.8 Under the first model, the random walk
model, the extent of an opinion's contribution to the law (and
thereby its influence) is determined by a host of independent
factors. These factors might include the subject matter, the
parties' shaping of the issue, the identity of the Justice drafting
the opinion, the amount of time since the statute was passed,
the ideological salience of the issue, and so forth. This model
produces a bell-shaped distribution of "step lengths," ranging
from baby to giant steps.
Under the second model, the bounded rationality model,
judges have bounded rationality and strong attachments to ex-
isting rules. This leads judges to take "baby steps" most of the
time, but to occasionally take "giant steps" when continued ad-
herence to an existing norm proves untenable. In empirical
studies by various social scientists, this kind of model has pro-
duced frequency distributions that are roughly normal but have
a characteristic known as "leptokurtosis." This model may well
be what Eskridge had in mind; in any event, it was my own
prediction about the data.
The third model, the tectonic model, stems from complexity
theory (also known as chaos theory or fractal geometry). This
type of model applies to many dynamic processes-for example,
7. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS passim (1962).
8. The choice of these Terms and other methodological issues are dis-
cussed infra in Part II.A.
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it fits the frequency distribution of earthquakes. The most im-
portant implication of this model is known as scaling: the same
patterns reproduce themselves (though with increased magnifi-
cation) at every level of magnitude. 9 Because earthquakes pro-
vide such a vivid analogy to legal change, I will refer to this as
the tectonic model.
This Article uses citation data to explore statutory inter-
pretation and tests three possible models. Part I discusses the
use of citation frequencies as a measure and lays out more care-
fully the three models described above. Part II describes the
methodology and presents the empirical data, including both
quantitative analysis and some qualitative assessments. Fi-
nally, Part III presents conclusions and suggestions for further
research.
I. PRIOR CITATION STUDIES AND POTENTIAL
STATISTICAL MODELS
This Article is not the first, nor hopefully the last, to inves-
tigate the dynamics of statutory interpretation. This part dis-
cusses briefly previous studies of the topic and my reasons for
adopting a different approach, before explaining the three mod-
els and their varying predictions.
A. INVESTIGATING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION
Although the normative dimension of statutory interpreta-
tion has received the most attention, there have been some im-
portant empirical studies. These studies share a common tech-
nique. They focus on judicial methodology and examine the
various sources of authority cited in judicial opinions. In a nut-
shell, the general conclusion of these studies is that courts rely
on a range of authority, use an eclectic set of techniques, and
vary somewhat over time in their use of specific sources such as
legislative history. 10
9. These models are discussed in more detail infra in Part I.B.
10. The two leading works in this genre are probably Jane S. Schacter,
The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statu-
tory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Be-
yond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998) and Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority
in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073(1992). For a discussion of works dealing specifically with the use of legislative
history by courts, see Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001). In addition, of course, there are many excellent
doctrinal analyses of recent opinions and historical studies of statutory inter-
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This is invaluable information, but it has its limits. First,
these studies essentially tell us what courts say about their de-
cision making, rather than what they do when making deci-
sions. Presumably, what courts say and what they do are re-
lated, but the strength of the connection is uncertain. Second,
although these studies suggest that courts are often dynamic in
the sense of consulting nonoriginalist sources, they reveal noth-
ing about the magnitude of dynamism. Courts might exhibit a
very sleepy form of dynamism, in which courts use nonoriginal-
ist material only to justify tiny incremental steps toward
changing the law "one case at a time." These studies cannot tell
us whether statutory interpretation moves by glacial evolution,
by fiery revolutions, or by some combination of the two. Just
how dynamic is "dynamic" in this setting?
Although undoubtedly an imperfect indicator, citation fre-
quency can help us get a handle on these questions about the
pace of legal change. Clearly, a host of extraneous factors can
influence the number of citations that an opinion receives. In
general, however, citation impact is a plausible measure of the
significance of an opinion, that is, of how far it "moves" the law.
An opinion that contributes little new information about the
law will not be very useful to later courts, nor will it usually be
of much interest to commentators. Thus, citation frequency
provides at least a rough measure of how significantly an opin-
ion changes the law.
Although citation studies are a burgeoning area of scholar-
ship, most studies by academics have (perhaps not surpris-
ingly) focused on citations of academic works, often with the
purpose of discovering which professor is the "fairest of them
all."'" A smaller body of work has investigated citations of
cases, focusing largely on two issues. One strand of studies has
focused on the "aging" of judicial authority, showing that judi-
cial opinions generally have limited half-lives. 12 The other ma-
pretation.
11. See generally Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985) (discussing the most-cited law review articles and
their "objectively measured impact"); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal
Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409 (2000) (presenting data on the fifty "most-
cited legal scholars of all time").
12. See Peter Clinch, The Use of Authority: Citation Patterns in the Eng-
lish Courts, 46 J. DOCUMENTATION 287, 303-08 (1990); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J.L. & ECON. 249, 259 (1976); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Ci-
tations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme
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jor line of studies has focused on which judges are the most in-
fluential. 13 Only one article has apparently attempted to use
the distribution of citation frequencies as a gauge of the dy-
namics of the legal process.14
Unlike many other kinds of empirical data that might be of
interest, citation frequencies are readily available using cur-
rent online search techniques. It is an old joke that social sci-
ence research resembles a drunk looking for his keys under a
light post simply because he can see better there, but there is
something to the joke. Particularly for exploratory research, an
imperfect but readily available source of information is espe-
cially valuable and has a genuine edge over a more nearly ideal
but practically inaccessible source. At a minimum, this ready
availability is a good enough reason to collect the data in the
hopes of finding noteworthy patterns that will provide a
springboard for future research.
As with any measure, using citation frequencies has its
limitations. A recent study of judicial influence aptly explained
that citations "are at best a crude and rough proxy for measur-
ing influence." 15 Several of the data limitations discussed in
that study are relevant here. "Super" precedents might be un-
dercounted if they settle the law so effectively that no further
cases are brought (or at least appealed). Correspondingly, an
ambiguous precedent might be overcounted because lower
courts are unsure of when it is relevant or what it means.
Judges may also use overkill in citations, piling on multiple ci-
tations for the same basic point.' 6 In addition to these defects,
citation frequency will underestimate the boldness of some ju-
dicial interpretations if the statute is amended or repealed,
thereby eliminating the decision's relevance. To some extent,
these defects can be countered by considering citations in law
Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 423-27 (1977).
13. E.g., Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 299 (2004); David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence
of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371
(1999); Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court
Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998); William M. Landes et al., Judicial In-fluence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271 (1998).
14. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of
the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
545 (2000) (discussed in more detail infra Part I.B.3).
15. Landes et al., supra note 13, at 271.
16. See id. at 273-75.
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reviews as well as in cases: academics are likely to devote con-
siderable attention to "super" precedents, are less prone to
string citations, and are likely to be interested in Supreme
Court decisions connected with a statutory amendment. Over-
all, despite their possible defects, citation frequencies provide
the best available index of the significance of opinions in this
study.
B. THREE MODELS OF INTERPRETATION
We cannot know in advance whether any significant pat-
terns will exist in the data, nor can we ever be positive that we
have correctly identified their causes even if we find such pat-
terns. Before examining the data, however, it is helpful to have
some working hypotheses. This part considers three plausible
models of legal change and discusses the kind of statistical dis-
tribution associated with each one.
1. Model One: A Random Walk Through the U.S. Reports
One obvious possibility is that citation frequencies are
more or less random, that is, they are the product of unrelated
factors operating in different directions, which happen to bal-
ance out one way or another in a particular case. This model
could be tied to the view that the Court typically aims for a par-
ticular level of "narrow and shallow" opinions. 17 Among the pos-
sible factors influencing citation counts might be the specific
statutory language at issue, the quality of the parties' briefing,
the frequency of litigation in the area, the opinion's author, the
presence of dissent, subsequent legislative or administrative
actions, the clarity of the opinion, and the economic impact of
the decision, to name a few.
Trying to identify and measure these various factors is be-
yond the scope of this study. As it turns out, however, we may
be able to identify this kind of randomness without specifying
the causal links. A basic theorem of mathematical statistics
links this form of randomness with the famous bell-shaped,
normal distribution. More precisely, the central limit theorem
states that "the sum of a large number of independent random
variables will be approximately normally distributed almost
regardless of their individual distributions; any random vari-
able which can be regarded as the sum of a large number of
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARv. L. REV. 4, 15-21 (1995).
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small, independent contributions is thus likely to follow the
normal distribution approximately."1 8
We could not expect an exact correspondence between cita-
tion data and the normal distribution, if only because the nor-
mal distribution requires an infinite domain in both directions
while the number of citations to an opinion cannot be a nega-
tive number. In assessing deviations from normality, a few pa-
rameters are especially useful: Central tendency indicates that
the mean, the median, and the mode of a normal distribution
are the same; the skew parameter measures symmetry, which
is zero for the normal distribution (a normal curve is symmetri-
cal rather than skewed in either direction);19 and kurtosis
measures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked,
compared with the normal distribution.20 Kurtosis for the nor-
mal distribution is sometimes given as three,21 but the formula
used by the software for this study gives the normal distribu-
tion a kurtosis of zero.
I will examine later whether the frequency distribution for
citation counts has these characteristics. Note that in this
model, as with traits like human height and weight, there is a
clearly defined "typical case" and a continuum of increasingly
rare deviations from the norm. Thus, although an NBA player
might be unusually tall, it would make little sense to say that
his height "ruptured" size expectations.
2. Model Two: Sticky Norms and Paradigm Shifts
Speaking of ruptures makes more sense in terms of the
second model. In this model, for a variety of possible reasons,
judicial behavior is "sticky." Judges are reluctant to deviate
from existing norms, perhaps due to a belief in judicial re-
straint, and, hence, are usually prone to take only "baby steps."
It is difficult to move judges far away from the status quo.
When the status quo finally becomes untenable, however,
judges are likely to flip to a new equilibrium well removed from
the existing one. Thus, behavior is characterized by long bouts
of "normal science" punctuated by occasional "paradigm shifts."
Compared with a normal distribution, midrange changes are
18. M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 109 (2d ed. corrected re-
print, Dover 1979) (1967). For a sketch of one proof, see id. at 115-16.
19. See id. at 61-63.
20. See id. at 63-65.
21. See id. at 61-65, 111.
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disfavored-usually only small changes will occur, but large
changes will also be overrepresented compared with the normal
curve.22 This kind of decision making is closely associated with
bounded human rationality, which leads individuals to use
heuristics and rules of thumb that distort their responses to
new information. 2 3
There are several reasons to expect that this model would
accurately capture statutory interpretation opinions. First,
judges are presumably as prone to bounded rationality as any-
one else. Thus, it would be surprising if their behavior did not
show some signs of stickiness due to the use of heuristics,
sticky norms, or "herding" effects. Second, since Supreme Court
Justices face few, if any, penalties for errors, they may be un-
der less pressure than other actors to conform their behavior to
the theoretical standard of rational conduct. Third, studies
have shown significant evidence of this kind of behavior in a
variety of contexts, including stock market purchases, 24 con-
gressional budgeting decisions, 25 and partisan voting mar-
gins.26
Like the random walk model, this model is associated with
a characteristic statistical property called leptokurtosis; we ex-
pect sharper peaks and fatter tails than the bell curve.27 The
software used in this Article classifies any distribution with a
kurtosis greater than zero as leptokurtic. Bryan Jones, a politi-
cal scientist who has studied bounded rationality models, ex-
plains the implications of this statistical property:
Leptokurtosis in output data has an important implication for deci-
sionmaking. Change data from human institutions have, in compari-
son to the Gaussian [normal] distribution, an excess of cases in the
central peak, an excess of cases in the tails of the distribution, but a
paucity of cases in the "shoulders," the area between the central peak
and the tails. The general substantive interpretation of these results
is that change in human institutions tends to be quite conservative-
22. For a general discussion of this kind of behavioral model, see Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). For a discussion of whether this model is or is not
likely to apply to judges, see Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
23. For an extensive discussion of how this idea applies in political sci-
ence, see BRYAN D. JONES, POLITICS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE:
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND GOVERNANCE (2001).
24. Id. at 164-68.
25. Id. at 174-75.
26. Id. at 171-73.
27. See id. at 164-67.
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most cases clustered around a central peak-but is subject to occa-
sional quite large punctuation (the tails). On the other hand, moder-
ate change, as represented in the shoulders of the distribution, seems
underrepresented-at least in comparison with the Gaussian. It
would seem that a hypothetical decision maker would have to be pre-
pared either for virtually no change or a very large change-he or she
could not hope for moderate adjustments to changing circumstances. 28
According to Jones, however, the scale of these effects
should not be exaggerated. Distributions are generally not
greatly removed from normal, so that political and economic in-
stitutions "are not wildly out of line with what theories of adap-
tive behavior predict" but the distribution still leaves room for
"bounded rationality 'showing through.' ' 29
3. Model Three: Complexity Theory and Scaling Laws
The third model is developed in an innovative study of ju-
dicial citations by David Post and Michael Eisen. 30 They specu-
late that law may have the same branching properties that
generate certain fractal geometric objects, because a legal issue
can potentially sprout subissues, which in turn can sprout sub-
subissues, and that pattern continues. 31 Such fractal branching
is associated with power law distributions, in which frequency
varies as some power n of a basic parameter. Such distributions
are "produced at the boundary between order and disorder, at
the 'edge of chaos."'3 2 Power law distributions are "well nigh
ubiquitous in a wide variety of physical, biological, and social
systems."33 Post and Eisen cite examples involving meteorol-
ogy, demographics, biodiversity, and medicine, as well as the
example I have chosen as emblematic, earthquake sizes.34
Based on a very large sample of New York Court of Appeals
cases and another sample of Seventh Circuit decisions, Post
28. Id. at 184.
29. Id. at 173.
30. Post & Eisen, supra note 14.
31. Id. at 552-58.
32. Id. at 568.
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id. at 569 n.37. For another recent example, see Pablo A. Marquet, Of
Predators, Prey, and Power Laws, 295 SCIENCE 2229, 2229 (2002) (referring to
the "vast number of biological power laws"). General background on power
laws can be found in MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS, POWER LAWS:
MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE PARADISE (1991). Some other applications of
power laws to legal problems are discussed in Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities
Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
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and Eisen find a good fit with their hypothesized power law
(especially for the New York data).35
The earthquake example is especially evocative. Just as
tectonic plates encounter frictions and develop stresses, which
are then resolved by earthquakes, so the fabric of the law can
easily be imagined as developing similar stresses and strains.
Indeed, the fact that most of the Supreme Court's statutory
cases involve conflicts between the circuits suggests a collision
between opposing principles or rules of law, which the Court
must then somehow resolve.36
Like the bounded rationality model, the tectonic model
predicts a distribution more sharply peaked than the normal
curve. It differs from the bounded rationality model in two sig-
nificant respects. First, there is no expectation of producing
anything that resembles a bell-shaped curve. Second, power
laws have a crucial quality known as scaling. As Post and Eisen
explain, fractal objects (which exemplify power laws) have no
natural scale-any one section has the same structure (on a
smaller scale) as the whole. "No matter how high the magnifi-
cation, no matter how deep into the structure you look, it al-
ways looks exactly, dizzingly, the same."3 7 More specifically,
this means that there is only a quantitative, and not a qualita-
tive, difference between "normal science" and "paradigm shift-
ing," just as the mechanisms and form of a small trembler are
the same as those of a major earthquake except for the degree
of violence.
When geologists conduct seismic studies, they observe
many small earthquakes and a few major earthquakes. This is
not because of any fundamental difference between "normal"
and "paradigm-shifting" seismic events. Rather, the same pat-
tern holds even when distinguishing between tiny and merely
small seismic events, or between large and gargantuan ones.
Thus, in this model, paradigm shifts are just normal science
''writ large."
35. Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 571-83.
36. I originally planned to tabulate which cases involved circuit conflicts
and which involved some other basis for granting certiorari. I gave up on this
idea fairly quickly, as it became clear that a large majority of cases involved
circuit conflicts.
37. Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 551; see also id. at 559, 569 (compar-
ing the generation of legal argumentation with the "recursive process" of the
physical and biological world).
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II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The empirical research was conducted in two phases. The
first and somewhat more exploratory phase covered the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1990 Term. Based on the findings in the first
phase, the second phase was closer to the social science ideal,
using hypotheses and tests determined in advance and employ-
ing a more rigorous and detailed method of data collection.
A. METHODOLOGY
Having first decided to undertake positive rather than
normative research, I was then faced with the question of how
to investigate dynamic interpretation empirically. An examina-
tion of the literature revealed that relatively little use had been
made of the vast amount of data now available from electronic
resources such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. Bryan Jones's work
provided my initial inspiration, since it was not hard to put his
work together with the legal literature on sticky norms and
precedential cascades. 38 My initial working hypothesis was that
citation frequencies would follow the random walk model, with
modified normal distributions resembling Jones's findings,
symmetrical and single-peaked but with some leptokurtosis.
The sample for this phase of the study consisted of cases
from a single Supreme Court Term. To avoid the distorted com-
parison that would result from using cases from different
years-an earlier case has had more time to accumulate cita-
tions than a later one-I focused on a single year. In choosing a
particular year it was necessary to choose one early enough
that cases had ample opportunity to accumulate citations to
limit the effect of random variations in year-to-year citation
rates for individual cases. On the other hand, a more recent
year was necessary to reasonably represent the modern inter-
pretative regime, rather than some earlier world such as the
Warren Court. With these considerations in mind, I semiran-
domly chose the 1990 Term.
Cases decided in the 1990 Term are located in Volume 111
of the West Supreme Court Reporter. Volume 111 contains 231
cases. I excluded per curiam opinions (including summary re-
versals and remands) and cases falling within the Court's
original jurisdiction, which left 117 appellate cases decided
with full opinion. Because the dynamics of statutory interpreta-
38. See JONES, supra note 23.
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tion is the focus of the study, I excluded any case that was par-
tially constitutional or common law in nature, so that all cases
in my study involved purely statutory interpretation. 39 I also
eliminated cases that involved the interpretation of federal
statutes but had begun in state court. An issue arising in state
court might naturally garner additional citations in other state
courts, which could lead to a bias because state decisions vastly
outnumber federal decisions. This left me with sixty-five
cases.
40
I next set about finding how many times each case had
been cited.41 This process proved to be much easier than ex-
pected because West's KeyCite feature presents information
about citations in different ways, such as whether the citation
is by a court or a periodical, the citation date, which key num-
ber in the opinion is being cited, and whether the case is dis-
cussed, criticized, or merely cited without comment. KeyCite
automatically generates citation counts in these various cate-
gories. As I began collecting the data, I noticed almost immedi-
ately that the numbers seemed to be quite scattered, with little
apparent clustering around a central value. After gathering the
total number of citations for all of the cases (including citations
in other cases as well as secondary sources), I went back and
obtained a separate count on citations in judicial opinions to
investigate whether combining citations from different sources
was affecting the results. The bulk of the noncase citations
were from law reviews, but I did not tabulate them separately
in this phase of the study.
Using QuattroPro, a simple spreadsheet program of the
kind commonly packaged with word processing programs, I
next set about analyzing the data, first finding averages,
means, kurtosis, and skew figures. I then constructed fre-
quency distributions and looked at various permutations such
as log log and semi-log graphs. Finally, I experimented with fit-
ting other curves to the data, such as exponential or Poisson
39. Note that I included cases involving interpretation of the federal pro-
cedural or evidentiary rules.
40. In most cases, the inclusion decision was easy to make, but there were
a few tough calls. The most notable was Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722(1991), a habeas ruling which mentions the applicable federal statute but ap-
pears to be almost entirely based on a common law theory of equitable discre-
tion. Because the statute seemed so incidental to the decision, I ultimately ex-
cluded it from the data set.
41. The search was conducted on February 2, 2002. The complete list of
cases and citation counts can be found in appendix table A.
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distributions, using regression analysis to test the goodness of
fit.42
In looking at the figures on case versus total citations, I
was surprised that some of the cases which were most familiar
to me, such as Johnson Controls,4 3 had very few citations in
later opinions compared to the number of noncase (primarily
law review) citations. 44 I then set about calculating the ratio of
case to noncase citations. A regression of the number of case
versus noncase citations for each opinion showed little correla-
tion. Finally, I examined fifteen opinions more carefully. I took
the ten opinions with the highest number of citations, and di-
vided them into two groups (predominantly case versus pre-
dominantly noncase citations). For comparison purposes, I also
read the five cases closest to the median number of total cita-
tions.
From this first phase, I got a sense of what data were
available as well as some of the most readily usable methods
for processing the data. I also formed some hypotheses about
citation distributions. With this knowledge, I then set about the
second phase of my research. This time, I was somewhat more
systematic, using a random method to choose which Term to
study, formalizing the coding to some extent, and formulating
models in advance to be tested against the new data set.45 Hav-
42. For readers who are unfamiliar with regression analysis, Sage Publi-
cations, Inc. has published several helpful handbooks for social science stu-
dents in its series "Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences." See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, INTERPRETING AND USING REGRESSION (Sage Univ.
Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 29, 1982);
MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION (Sage
Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 22,
1980); LARRY D. SCHROEDER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (Sage Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in
the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 57, 1986).
43. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding
that an employer could not exclude women of childbearing age from a job that
involved potential risk of birth defects or miscarriage).
44. When I reran this query on August 25, 2004, I found 176 case cites,
803 law review cites, and 604 citations in other secondary sources.
45. I instructed my research assistant to choose a year between 1982 and
1995 at random (excluding 1990), which he did by drawing a slip of paper out
of a hat. The chosen year was 1984. Following the standards above, he then
classified the cases as either statutory or nonstatutory. There were approxi-
mately ten cases about which he was uncertain, so I made the decision. I later
removed two cases he had classified as statutory but which seemed to me
clearly constitutional in nature. He then collected a more detailed set of data,
including separate counts for state and federal citations, law reviews, page
lengths, and case descriptions. The searches were conducted on March 18, 21,
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ing received this data, I again calculated means, medians, kur-
tosis and skews, set up frequency diagrams, and did log log re-
gressions to test the third model. Thus, the second phase more
or less tracked the first, except with a new data set, somewhat
more care, and a greater degree of planning.
B. FINDINGS
The two Terms were rather unlike one another in some
ways. The composition of the Court changed, with the depar-
ture of Justices Brennan, Burger, and Powell, and the addition
of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter. There were more cases
in 1984 than in 1990, which corresponds with the recent trend
toward smaller Supreme Court caseloads. 46 Moreover, there
was also a difference in judicial methodology between the two
Terms: the Court was only one-third as likely to cite legislative
history in 1990 as in 1984; the later Term was apparently more
staunchly textualist than the earlier one. 47 Nevertheless, the
citation patterns from the two Terms were strikingly similar.
1. The 1990 Term
The data for the 1990 Term are displayed in appendix ta-
ble A. As can be seen from glancing at the data, there was a
large range in terms of numbers of citations per case. Consider-
ing the total number of citations (including both case and non-
case citations), the mean was 613, but the median was only
419. The standard deviation was 222, and both the leptokurto-
sis (3.08)48 and the skew (1.84) were pronounced. On average,
citations were evenly divided between case and noncase cites,
with a mean of 276 noncase cites. The distribution for noncase
cites was even more skewed, with a median of 160, a standard
deviation of 322, and both high kurtosis (7.8) and skew (2.7).
Figures 1 and 2 break out case and noncase citations, which is
somewhat more enlightening.
and 29, 2002. Eighty-six cases remained in the sample for the 1984 Term. A
complete list of these cases can be found in appendix table B.
46. For statistics on the two Terms, see The Supreme Court 1990 Term-
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 419-26 (1991); The Supreme Court
1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 322-29 (1985).
47. See the table in Vermeule, supra note 10, at 189.
48. Recall that the formula used by this software makes zero the kurtosis
of the normal curve.
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Figure 1: Case Citations to Cases Decided in the
1990 Term
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Figure 3: Log Log Plot of Noncase Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1990 Term
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Figure 4: Log Log Plot of Case Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1990 Term
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Testing for a power law requires a log log plot. 49 The re-
gression analysis indicates a close fit between the data and the
models, with an R2 of .83 for the noncase citations, and an al-
most identical R2 for the regression with case citations. In both
instances, the slope coefficient was about 1.2 and much larger
than the estimate of standard error. As an inspection of the
plots in figures 3 and 4 shows, the log log plots are much "bet-
ter behaved" and closer to linear than in figures 1 and 2.
As mentioned earlier, the apparent divergences between
case and noncase citations intrigued me, and the regression
analyses confirmed my impressions. Although an increase in
the number of case citations predicted a higher average number
of noncase citations, almost none of the variance was explained
(R2 = .07).50 When I divided the ten most cited cases into two
groups, based on the proportion of judicial versus nonjudicial
citations, the difference between the groups was striking. Of
the five cases in this group that were most frequently cited by
courts, all but one dealt with a procedural issue, and the excep-
tion dealt with Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) preemption. 51 The five cases most frequently cited in
law reviews were much different. 52 All but one of the cases in-
49. More complete results for the regression analyses for the 1990 Term
are in appendix table C. Using a single-tailed t-test, the coefficients are sig-
nificant at p < .01. (A two-tailed test would not be appropriate because we
know in advance that the coefficient is not positive; otherwise there would be
far higher impact than lower impact cases, which seems unlikely.) For an ex-
planation of the use of the t-statistic and a useful table, see SCHROEDER ET
AL., supra note 42, at 46-49, 82-83.
50. Although weak, the positive relationship was genuine. The coefficient
was significant atp < .025.
51. The five cases were FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (ERISA
preemption); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (involving
the statute of limitations in a Title VII case against the federal government);
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (addressing the burden of proof in cer-
tain bankruptcy procedures; also the most highly cited statutory case of the
1990 Term); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (evaluating habeas proce-
dure); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (analyzing
whether a forum selection clause violated a maritime statute).
52. The five cases were EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)
(examining the application of Title VII on foreign soil); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (applying statutory and constitu-
tional requirements of originality in copyright case); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (evaluating the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate a discrimination claim); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991) (dealing with an abortion counseling restriction); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (examining state sovereignty for interpretation
of civil rights law).
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volved discrimination law. The fifth case involved the statutory
and constitutional requirement of originality in copyright law,
an issue with strong implications for free speech. In short, the
courts seemed most keenly interested in procedure, while the
commentators were drawn to cases with quasi-constitutional
overtones.
2. The 1984 Term
The shapes of the distributions in the more careful 1984
study were similar. For the total citations, the mean was 741,
while the median was only 528. The standard deviation was
quite large (712), and both the skew (1.8) and the leptokurtosis
(2.9 on a scale with 0 for the normal curve) were pronounced.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of citations in all judicial opin-
ions. As figure 6 illustrates, the log log plot is once again much
better behaved.
Figure 5: Judicial Citations to Cases Decided in the
1984 Term
30 -.
M --r RM
10"
Number of Citations
[89:848
EARTHQUAKES AND TREMORS
Figure 6: Log Log Plot of Judicial Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1984 Term
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More focused counts were also tabulated for the 1984 data,
one of which tracked citations by federal appellate courts. Here,
the mean was lower (153), but we have the familiar story in
terms of kurtosis (11 in this instance) and skew (2.9). Again,
the plots tell the tale. As figures 7 and 8 show, the ordinary
plot for federal appellate citations is highly skewed and curved,
while the log log plot approaches linear.53 The regression re-
sults confirm this impression. The R2 on the log log plot was
.87, with a coefficient of -1.8 (significant at p < .01). Rather
than relying on a "noncase" count as in the 1990 analysis, the
analysis of the 1984 Term included a specific breakdown for ci-
tations in law reviews. Figures 9 and 10 show the relevant dis-
tributions. As figure 10 indicates, the log log regression again
comes out quite well, with an R2 of .83 and a coefficient of -1.6
(significant at p < .01).
53. Complete results from the regression analyses for the 1984 Term can
be found in appendix table D.
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Figure 7: Federal Appellate Court Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1984 Term
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Figure 9: Law Review Citations to Cases Decided in the
1984 Term
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Figure 10: Log Log Plot of Law Review Citations to
Cases Decided in the 1984 Term
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As a check on the relationship between different forms of
citation, I also ran a regression of federal court citations versus
law review citations. The regression confirmed that the fea-
tures of opinions that interest federal judges overlap only
slightly with those that interest academics. The R2 for the
model was only .07, meaning that virtually none of the variance
was explained. The coefficient was positive and significant (p <
.05), suggesting that some small overlap of interests exists but
that it is dwarfed by the other divergences.
Once again, an examination of the five most cited cases in
each category was revealing. Of the five cases with the highest
number of judicial cites, three dealt with procedural issues, one
involved ERISA, and one involved an erroneous jury instruc-
tion regarding municipal liability under the Civil Rights Act of
1861. 54 Consistent with the 1990 Term, the list of cases most
cited in law reviews was quite different. It contained a leading
copyright case, a disability discrimination case, a case on arbi-
tration of statutory claims, and a quasi-constitutional case on
state sovereign immunity. 55 The fifth case dealt with an impor-
tant issue in administrative law regarding judicial review of
nonenforcement decisions by administrative agencies. 56 As in
the 1990 Term, the only case on both lists from the 1984 Term
dealt with arbitration of statutory claims.
III. IMPLICATIONS
What, if anything, does this all mean? Given the fact that
only two Supreme Court Terms were studied and that the
methodology was fairly crude, any conclusions have to be
somewhat tentative. Nevertheless, in my view, the data provide
54. The five cases were United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (apply-
ing the plain error rule); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724 (1985) (involving ERISA preemption of a state statute; this case also came
very close to the top five list for law reviews); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808 (1985) (questioning municipal liability for inadequate police
training); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (determining appropri-
ateness of attorney's fees); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that antitrust claims may be ar-
bitrated; this is the only case on both lists).
55. In addition to Mitsubishi, the other cases were Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287 (1985) (involving a claim of discrimination based on disability);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (con-
cerning a copyright infringement claim); and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (evaluating a state's sovereign immunity in a Reha-
bilitation Act claim).
56. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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reasonable support for two conclusions. The first relates to the
dynamics of statutory interpretation. Taken as a whole, the
data seem most consistent with the tectonic model.5 7 The sec-
ond and somewhat firmer conclusion is that the idea of a typi-
cal statutory interpretation opinion is quite problematic. In
particular, the opinions that are likely to come to a law profes-
sor's mind as typical are likely to be quite different from those
that a judge or litigator would find typical. After discussing
these conclusions, I close with a brief discussion of possible di-
rections for further research.
A. TOWARD A THEORY OF TECTONIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Earlier in this Article, I sketched three models of the dy-
namics of statutory interpretation. The first of these models,
the random walk model, seems clearly inconsistent with the
data. The random walk model implies a normal distribution of
citation frequencies. The data for both years and for all catego-
ries of citations were not at all normally distributed, as can be
seen visually from inspecting the various figures and statisti-
cally from the high skew and kurtosis numbers.
The second model, the bounded rationality model, cannot
be rejected quite as confidently. This model predicts leptokur-
tosis, and while the data indeed display leptokurtosis, there
can be too much of a good thing. The "boundedness" part of the
model predicts leptokurtosis, but the "rationality" part of the
model suggests that deviations from the normal distribution
will not be too severe. Previous empirical support for this model
has involved distribution much less skewed than found here.58
On balance, despite my initial support for this model, the data
do not support it.
This leaves the third model, the tectonic model, which per-
formed very well and provided the best fit to the data. First, the
high R2 for each of the log log regressions shows that the model
explains much of the variance in citation frequencies. Second,
the coefficients for both years and for different categories of ci-
tations are strikingly similar, ranging between minus one and
57. Since only two other models were tested, however, it remains possible
that some other model would be superior.
58. This becomes clear from comparing the charts presented by JONES,
supra note 23, at 173, 175 and 178 with those presented in this Article. The
charts presented by Jones are much closer to the "bell-shaped" idea of the
normal distribution, although still significantly distorted.
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minus two. (Basically, in each case, the number of cases N with
a given number of citations per case C is given by a formula
roughly of the form, N = kC -1.5, where k is a constant that var-
ies for each set of citations.) Indeed, Post and Eisen obtained
similar coefficients for the data from the New York Court of
Appeals and for their combined data set from the Seventh Cir-
cuit.59 This suggests that the good fits are not merely happen-
stance, but instead reflect some underlying structural similar-
ity between the various sets of data.
Because such a broad range of phenomena is subject to
power laws of this kind, the existence of this law does not tell
us much about the underlying mechanism. That mechanism
might or might not take the form of the branching pattern dis-
cussed by Post and Eisen. 60 What we do know from the exis-
tence of such a power law, however, is that whatever mecha-
nism exists covers a wide range of scales. In other words, the
same basic mechanism should generate both tremors (opinions
which add little to the law and gather only a few cites) and
earthquakes (opinions which greatly shift the law and gather a
high number of cites).
The seismic analogy would support more serious considera-
tion of the idea that opinions are generated by stresses and
fractures in the law, which are resolved in large or small ways
by shifts on one side of the fault line or the other. These shifts,
in turn, may generate stresses elsewhere, resulting in later
seismic events involving related legal issues. It is common to
speak of "shifts in the legal landscape." The tectonic model sug-
gests that this analogy may be more exact, and that these
shifts may actually resemble earthquakes in some quantitative
way.
B. THE ELUSIVE "TYPICAL" OPINION
As we saw earlier, there is a tremendous spread among ci-
tation counts. Some Supreme Court opinions have been cited
only a few dozen times; others have been cited one or two thou-
sand times. The median opinion may have ten times as many
cites as one kind but only a fifth as many as the other. In sum,
the most typical attribute of any opinion, apparently, is to be
atypical.
59. Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 572-73, 583.
60. Id. at 552-58.
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Singling out particular opinions for study requires careful
thinking about what to look for in an opinion. Taking the me-
dian opinion is probably the best we can do in terms of identify-
ing what cases are representative of the whole set of statutory
interpretation opinions. However, if we are interested in how
major new law is made, rather than in seeing how the Court
handles fairly routine cases, these median cases may give a
misleading impression. New law is disproportionately made by
a dozen or so cases at the high end of the statistical distribu-
tion, and a study of median or run-of-the-mill cases will exclude
these blockbusters. Thus, if we are interested in the Court's
methodology, the median cases may be more revealing; if we
are interested in how statutory interpretation shifts, however,
we might be more interested in the outliers.
Determining what cases to study is further complicated be-
cause case impact is not unitary. Probably the clearest finding
of this study is that there are two almost completely independ-
ent dimensions of case impact. The characteristics that lead to
citations by courts seem to be quite different from those that
lead to citations by legal academics. Perhaps this should not be
a surprise. We already know that courts and academics differ
greatly in which secondary sources (such as law review articles)
they cite.6 1 It is, nonetheless, striking to see just how little cor-
relation there is between judicial and academic citations of Su-
preme Court cases.
One might view this finding as simply another confirma-
tion of the well-known (and apparently widening) chasm be-
tween the legal academy and the profession, but it would
probably be a mistake to view the split as merely reflecting an
"ivory tower" temperament among professors. The cases cited
most heavily in law reviews involve issues of genuine social im-
portance, even if they are not issues that give rise to extensive
litigation. In the 1990 Term, the case most heavily cited by
courts involved the burden of proof in certain bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. This issue is apparently important to bankruptcy
judges and practitioners, as well as to a large numbers of peo-
ple who are either bankruptcy petitioners or their creditors.
But, in some sense, it does not have the same fundamental so-
cial significance as the discrimination cases that had the lion's
61. See generally Deborah Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Schol-
ars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996) (comparing law review articles most frequently
cited by judges to those most frequently cited by academics).
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share of the attention in the law reviews. We should resist the
temptation to dismiss the judicial citation figures as merely in-
dicating the limited intellectual perspective of the profession or
the law review citation figures as merely indicating distance
from the real world of legal practice. Instead, we should view
them as reflecting independent but equally significant dimen-
sions of legal impact.
Academics who write about statutory interpretation proba-
bly need to be particularly careful because their ideas of typi-
cality are likely to reflect one of these dimensions much more
than the other. Thus, in selecting individual cases for analysis,
it is important to consider opinions that have a dramatic im-
pact on litigation and practice, as well as those that relate to
important social issues. A useful convention might be to rou-
tinely report both judicial and law review citation figures
whenever discussing a specific statutory interpretation opinion,
or at least the ratio between the two figures.
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
It is often much easier to generate new ideas for empirical
research than to actually carry them out. With that caveat in
mind, here are three ideas for extending the line of research
presented in this Article.
The first idea is simply to solidify the methodology used in
this paper. The methods could be made more rigorous by devel-
oping a more formal procedure for coding cases as statutory or
nonstatutory. Moreover, it would be possible, though time con-
suming, to use KeyCite to distinguish between citations to the
statutory and nonstatutory holdings of the same opinion. Also,
two years of Supreme Court opinions are not really enough.
Examining a greater number of years would provide greater
confidence in the results. Perhaps more importantly, it should
be possible to test some alternative models against the tectonic
model, which again would provide a greater level of confidence
about the conclusions. And, of course, the level of statistical so-
phistication could well be increased.
The second idea is to expand the analysis to include vari-
ous characteristics of each opinion. Using multivariate regres-
sion, for example, it would be useful to know whether a particu-
lar Justice's work has greater impact on lower courts or on
academics. It would also be useful to categorize the cases (for
example, as procedural or substantive). Perhaps most intrigu-
ing, the citation impact analysis could be combined with previ-
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ous work on the sources of authority in judicial opinions. Hold-
ing other variables constant, it would certainly be interesting to
know whether textualist opinions tend to have greater or lesser
impact than opinions relying on legislative history.
Third, longitudinal extensions of the study would shed
more light on the mechanisms involved in citation impact.
Cases may differ from each other primarily in their amount of
immediate impact or in their staying power. Moreover, by ex-
amining cases which actually discuss rather than merely cite
the opinion (another useful feature of KeyCite), one could
probably get a better grip on the extent to which cases are cited
because the holdings raise new issues as opposed to settling old
ones. It would also be interesting to connect the citation infor-
mation with the age of the statutory provision. Dynamic inter-
pretation, in the sense of updating old statutes, might show up
fairly clearly in the form of high impact opinions involving old
statutes. It would certainly be useful to get some sense of how
common such opinions really are and when they arise. It would
also be useful to determine whether these cases arose because
changing social or economic conditions have produced new
types of litigation; because changing social values made old
rules seem inappropriate; or because of changes elsewhere in
the legal landscape.
In addition to these possible directions for formal empirical
research, this Article also has some implications for the kinds
of informal case studies that are more common among law pro-
fessors. As we have seen, the idea of typicality seems to be
quite problematic in this area, and legal scholars need to be
sensitive to the issue of case selection. Scholars also probably
need to make a special effort to include cases with high levels of
judicial citations, even if those opinions are not on issues that
legal academics consider "sexy."
CONCLUSION
The central findings of this study can be simply stated. The
data are sharply at odds with the first model tested, that of a
bell-shaped curve. The citation frequencies deviate greatly from
the normal distribution. The data reflect leptokurtosis, the sta-
tistical attribute associated with the second model, that of
bounded rationality. (This is also a model in which decisions
mostly fall into two separate classes: small incremental
changes and major ruptures of existing law.) Unlike the leading
studies of bounded rationality, however, the data showed more
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extreme deviations from normality, suggesting that something
more than sticky norms or bounded rationality may be in-
volved. The third model (tectonic statutory interpretation) pro-
vides a good fit for the data. Thus, although this study falls far
short of "proving" the validity of the tectonic model, it seems to
be the best working hypothesis.6 2
The tectonic model serves as an important addition to ex-
isting visions of statutory interpretation. Viewing appellate
opinions as seismic events-large or small legal shifts that re-
solve stresses between conflicting legal forces while sometimes
creating new stresses-may prove to be a fruitful perspective. If
nothing else, it is a good reminder to expect the unexpected. If
this model is correct, every now and then, just as with earth-
quakes, we can expect to run into legal shifts of extraordinary
magnitude, far out of line with past year-to-year experience.
The model suggests that these megacases are extraordinary in
their impact, but not in the mechanisms that produce them.
Much of legal scholarship is in essence a search for fruitful
metaphors. The earthquake metaphor may turn out to be not
only striking but quantitatively valid.
Another implication of this study is that we should be very
cautious about the concept of the "typical" statutory interpreta-
tion case. The idea of a "typical" interpretation case is problem-
atic in three ways. First, the diversity of Supreme Court rul-
ings is surprisingly great. At the extremes, one case in the 1984
TerM6 3 had been cited only once by a later federal appeals court
as of 2002, while another case 64 garnered over eleven hundred
federal appellate citations during the same period. Second,
opinions seem to have two, largely unrelated, types of signifi-
cance. The amount of attention an opinion receives from lower
federal courts has almost no correlation with the attention it
receives in law reviews; an academic's impression of the "typi-
cal" opinion likely differs from that of a judge or lawyer. Third,
averages are relatively meaningless because the distributions
have such long right tails. Thus, at least if typicality is judged
by citation impact, speaking of the "typical" interpretation case
is somewhat like speaking of the "typical" nation-state, given
62. See supra Part III.A for further discussion.
63. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
470 U.S. 583 (1985) (upholding Georgia tax on bank shares as consistent with
31 U.S.C. § 3124 (a)).
64. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (applying the plain error
rule).
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the huge variations among nations on various different dimen-
sions such as per capita income and population.65
Regardless of the ultimate validity of the conclusions
reached in this study, citation impact figures are a valuable
and largely untapped source of information about the dynamics
of statutory interpretation, which cry out for further investiga-
tion. They could also help identify which individual cases are
worth in-depth study. Legal scholars notoriously focus on nor-
mative matters-typically, what the courts should be doing in
some area of the law. Important as those questions are, there is
also much to be learned about how the judicial system actually
operates.
The results reported in this Article are limited to a particu-
lar type of case in a particular Supreme Court Term, and no
doubt much could be done to increase the methodological so-
phistication of the study. One might say that we are now in the
position of casual explorers who have found paintings in the
mouth of a cave. The real treasures are probably farther inside
the cave, and with luck they will receive the attention of pro-
fessional investigators. Even these tentative, preliminary re-
sults, however, provide tantalizing hints of future discoveries.
65. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the typicality question.
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APPENDIX TABLE A:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES
IN THE 1990 TERM
Total Case
Citation Case Statute/Subject Citations Citations
495~ ~ ~~~~~~~~LI U..1 ie ,Ae aieJn"At(6US. C. 72 48
Corp, p.§68
498 U.S. 52 FMC Corp. v. Holliday Employee Retirement
Income Security Act 1068 762
of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
§ 1001)
498' Uf.S. 78 AraiI.Oi oe eea oe c 119) 29
498 U.S. 89 Irwin v. Department Title VII of the Civil
of Veterans Affairs Rights Act of 1964 1447 1243
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(c))
49811 U.S. Y 10 M...a Iv. United' Crimia (18 U..C 30 224
States § 23141)
498 U.S. 184 Demarest v. Witness Fees (28 276 165
Manspeaker U.S.C. § 1821)
498 U.S. 211 Mobil Oil Exploration
v. United Distribution
498,1 U.S. 292 Uite Stats vr.It
Entrpiss Inc.
498 U.S. 337 McDermott
International, Inc. v.
Wilander
.U3 nied Ste s
498 U..43 ennis v. Higgins1
Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 (15 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 523(a))
Rm . n. P. 1 7(c)
Jones Act (46 U.S.C.
App. § 688)
98 32 66
2548 2392 156
451 291 160
I348 157 191
McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc.
Immigration Reform
and Control Act of
1986 (8 U.S.C. 359 222 137
878
Noncase
Citations
275
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498 U.S. 533 Business Guides, Inc. FED. R. CIv. P. 11
v. Chromatic
Communications 632 401 231
West Virginia Civil Rights
University Hospitals, Attorney's Fees
Inc. v. Casey Award Act of 1976
Uccupational batety
and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. § 651
Pt Rpno)
400 u., 1o ilierlallunai union, rregnancy
UAW v. Johnson Discrimination Act
Controls, Inc. (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k)); Title VII 924
of the Civil Rights
Act (42 U.S.C.
152 772
499 U.S. 315 United States v. Home Owners' Loan
Gaubert Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 790 614 176
Omni Outdoor
4'5 I.. -o, ivieniesiey v. ....
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2) 588 343 245
isouse o 2 23e 1r6 6Haheas Corpus (28 2139 1673 466
'soo u.. auc noLuage oavings iAss n i.fl.U. s iuuiia)
v. Commissioner 358 57 301
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499 U.S. 585 Carnival Cruise Lines, Forum Selection
Inc. v. Shute Clause (46 U.S.C. 1072 548 524
btevens v.
Department of the
Treasury
Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of
1967 (29 U.S.C.
9 9 -1N
119 62 57
500 U.S. 72 International Primate Removal Jurisdiction
Protection League v. (28 U.S.C.
Administrators of § 1442(a)(1)) 236 128 108
Tulane Educational
jarLny V. rJronson uonnneient
Conditions (28 U.S.C. 170 123 47
States
F'arrey, v.i anderfoot
Owen v. Owen
Sumit Heatlth, Ltd.
\' Pinhas '
Braxton v. United
States
§ 1951)
Bankr1upI II tcy ( II
Bankruptcy (11
U.S.C. § 522(f))
Sheorman Act (15-
United States
Sentencing
166 75 91
410 1 16 224
415 235 180
150 92 58
723 504 219
500 U.S. 646 Clark v. Roemer Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c)
7501 U.S. 78 Johnaon"T %-. Hompi enxut 1
501 U.S. 89 Melkonyan v. Sullivan Equal Access to
Justice Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B))
109 54 55
479 55
880 [89:848
,0 U.S 2 ) 91
500 U.S. 305
500 U.S. 344
U.S.C. 1983)
534
EARTHQUAKES AND TREMORS
501 U.S. 115 Gollust v. Mendell
501 U.S. 129
501 U.S. 157 Toibb v. Radloff
Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 190 91 99
§ 16(b) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b))
Bankrtcy 1 50 330 124
Bankruptcy (11
ST I I-l 507 2312 2757
U.S. 350 Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson
Houston Lawyers
Ass'n v. Attorney
Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10(b) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b)); SEC Rule
10b-5 (CFR
§240.10b-5)
Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C.
6 1971)
1584 894 690
149 47 102
Du1 U.0. oil I vVIsconsin ruDlIc reural iinSecLlCiue,
Intervenor v. Mortier Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (7 658 286 372
U.S.C. §§ 136v,
581 529 52
Totals 39,875 21,946 17,929
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Totals 39,875 21,946 17,929
Federal Law
Citation Case Statute/Subject Citations Appellate Review
Citations Citations
49U'S. 8L' .Uie .R n.69e 805 179 1171
Statj Ies
469 U.S. 45 United States v.
Abel
469 U.S. 70 United State
Pow\ell
469 U.S. 70 Garcia v. United
Commissioner
469 U.S. 189 Park N'Fly, Inc. v.
Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc.
469 U.S. 241 United Staitesv
469 U.S. 256 Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood
School District No.
40-1
469 U(I 274 (Thin nye
469 U.S. 287 Alexander v. Choate
Unitedon S t
4691JS 464 Brandon v. Holt
F. R. EVID. 403 &
608(bo)
Crimna (i121 USC
Criminal (18 U.S.C.
-1I -
I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(l),
368(a)(1)(A)
Copyight ( 17 USC
Trademark Act of
1946 (Lanhan Act)
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1065,
1115(b))
Payment in Lieu of
Taxes Act (31 U.S.C.
§ 6902(a))
lsnknipteyv (I1I
U.S.C. § 104(4I)(h))
Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C.
§ 794)
CiCl§§ 7602, 7t609
Civi Riht Ac (42'
515 148 163
814 142 270
976 - 6 4 0 115
141 22 66
707 1 52
1153 148 585
2021 1143 150
11 unemicai uiean vvater AcL
Manufacturers Ass'n § 301() (33 U.S.C.
v. Natural Resources § 1311() 488 134 197
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APPENDIX TABLE B:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES
IN THE 1984 TERM
[89:848
i
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470 U.S. 184 Heckler v. Turner Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. I 602(a)) 143 46 24
County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian
Trade & Intercourse
Act of 1790 (1 Stat.
229)
562 92 298
Article 17 (49 U.S.C. 435 43 213
470 U.S. 451 National Railroad Rail Passenger
Passenger Corp. v. Service Act of 1970
Atchison, Topeka & (45 U.S.C. §§ 541, 232 49 59
Santa Fe Railway 561, 565)
v. Bartow County 55 1 7
Board of Tax
41v u.o. ooo nenneti v. ArentucKy
Department of
Education
47,0 U.'S. 7,29 FloridaL Raweri &
Ligh1t (Ce. v. Lor imn
470 U.S. 768 Lindahl v. Office of
Personnel
Management
rlementary ann
Secondary Education
Act (20 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 1234)
Hob,1, Ac t (28 U..t
Federal Government
Disability
Retirement Program
(5 U.S.C. §§ 7703,
77 32 20
4741 149 3
429 243 71
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470 U.S. 856 Ball v. United States Criminal (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h)(1); 18 U.S.C.
App. § 1202(a)(1))
471 U.S. 48 Southern Motor Sherman Act (15
Carriers Rate U.S.C. § 1)
Conference, Inc. v.
555 238 98
529 65 228
4 11 U.,). 10ZI Lft V. mms r reeoom o
Information Act (5
TT 0 0 £ -O\
164 43 53
471 U.S. 202 Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck
Labor Management
Relations Act (29 1845 354 252
U.S.C. 6 185(a))
Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 1983); New
Mexico Tort Claims
Act (N.M. STAT. ANN.
846 354
U.b. 34 UommoOsty V utures bankruptcy (11
Trading Commission U.S.C. §§ 761-766) 826 46 247
States (7 U.S.C. 671 187 285
884 [89:848
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471 U.S. 524 Connecticut
Department of
Income Maintenance
Medicaid Act (42
U.S.C. § 1296d)
110 34 23
4 i u.0. ool uureul sipiier necurlnes icu oi
Co. v. Landreth 1933 (15 U.S.C.
§ 77); Securities 437 91 50
Exchange Act of
19 24 (15 TT R C & 7M
471 U.. 707 Hillsborough County Public Health
v. Automated Service Act § 351 (42 959 109 375
Medical U.S.C. § 252(d))
411 u. n. ioj viontana v. indian lvnineral
Blackfeet Tribe of Leasing Act of 1938 258 49 129
4(1 U. . nun U. lanoma uty v. U u l\, k ggts Act 42
411 U.n. on cusseu V. Unltea
States
472 U.h. 115 Atkins v. Parker
uriminal ib
§ 844(I)) 204 83 60
od btamp Act (7i r S Arxt
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472 U.S. 181 Lowe v. SEC Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (15
-T oI - OA - \\
324 23 168
Wholesale U.S.C. § 1);
Stationers, Inc. v. Robinson-Patman 1011 82 442
Pacific Stationery & Price Discrimination
. o jonson v. Mcayor oi Age iuiscrimlnaon
Baltimore in Employment Act 148 21 43
of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
Aspen biuing o.V. 51nermanAct (l
Aspen Highlands U.S.C. § 2)
4I2 U./. h - United atates v.
982 128 443
527 108 242
4 IL u. . OqO oean V. ±NeiSOin Lmiliilgraulon alo
Nationality Act (8
U.S.C.
§§ 1182(d)(5)(A),
1225(b));
Administrative
Procedure Act (5
619 136 254
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473 U.S. 52 United States v.
Shearer
Federal Tort Claims
Act (28 U.S.C. 348 127 90
League of North Relations Act (29 351 45 126
4i( U.n. 1o IxsenucKy nureau oi
State Police v.
Graham
UIVII lgnts A-cT ;4Z
U.S.C. § 1983); Civil
Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act of
1976 (42 U.S.C.
£ 1 o.\
3031 506 190
. 204 Atascaoero btate renaonitation Act ot
Hospital v. Scanlon 1973 § 504 (29 U.S.C. 1918 307 823
Thomas v. Union Federal Insecticide,
Carbide Agricultural Fungicide, and
Products Co. Rodentcide Act (7 811 104 330
U.S.C.
0- UCO 1o 'UUiCUIlIlIUII V. 1NflbU[ ilnte~rstate n~greemeni
on Detainers (N.J. 283 63 21
STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:159A-1 et seq.)
Totals 63,758 13,128 17,782
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APPENDIX TABLE C:
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR 1990 TERM
Case Citations (Log Log)
X Coefficient -1.10"*
(0.16)
Constant 3.56
(0.21)
R 2  0.83
df 10
N 12
Noncase Citations (Log Log)
X Coefficient -1.28**
(0.19)
Constant 3.9
(0.23)
R 2  0.83
df 10
N 12
Case versus Noncase Citations
X Coefficient 0.23*
(0.10)
Constant 199.65
(315.44)
R 2  0.07
df 63
N 65
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
** p < .01
*p <.025
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APPENDIX TABLE D:
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR 1984 TERM
Federal Appellate Citations (Log Log)
X Coefficient -1.84**
(0.27)
Constant 5.38
(0.26)
R2 0.87
Law Review Citations (Log Log)
X Coefficient -1.56**
(0.26)
Constant 4.78
(0.25)
R2 0.83
df 7
N 9
Federal Appellate Citations versus
Law Review Citations
X Coefficient 0.30*
(0.12)
Constant 160.43
(204.53)
R 2  0.07
df 84
N 86
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
**p <.01
* p < .05
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